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#### “Engagement” requires the provision of positive incentives

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 1-2

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

De LaHunt 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct)

Incentives work on a *quid pro quo* basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

#### “Substantial increase” must be at least 50-100 percent

UNEP 2 (United Nations Environmental Program, 10-2, www.unep.org/geo/geo3/english/584.htm)

Change in selected pressures on natural ecosystems 2002-32. For the ecosystem quality component, see the explanation of the Natural Capital Index. Values for the cumulative pressures were derived as described under Natural Capital Index. The maps show the relative increase or decrease in pressure between 2002 and 2032. 'No change' means less than 10 per cent change in pressure over the scenario period; small increase or decrease means between 10 and 50 per cent change; substantial increase or decrease means 50 to 100 per cent change; strong increase means more than doubling of pressure. Areas which switch between natural and domesticated land uses are recorded separately.

#### Limits --- our interp functionally narrows the topic because few cases can defend conditioning --- the alternative is hundreds of single import or export cases that explode the Neg’s research burden

#### Precision – The plan doesn’t meet the best definition of the topic — key to precise limits and predictable ground. Broad definitions over-generalize, undermining conceptual clarity.

### 1NC DA

#### Farm bill passage likely – vote next week

SDL, Stuttgart Daily Leader, 1-20-2014 <http://www.stuttgartdailyleader.com/article/20140120/NEWS/140129967>

The outlook for completion of the new Farm Bill turned increasingly positive last week as one of the last major areas of disagreement — dairy policy — was being addressed. As of today, it appears House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) and Agriculture Committee Ranking Member Collin Peterson (D-Minn.) are nearing a compromise on a new dairy policy. ¶ If this compromise holds, it should pave the way for the remaining issues to be resolved, final bill language drafted, budget scores obtained, and all the finishing touches put on the Farm Bill over the next week, while Congress is in recess. This should position the Agriculture Committee leadership to bring the Farm Bill conference report to the House and Senate floor for approval the week of Jan. 27. ¶ On the issue of payment limits and "actively engaged", House Agriculture Committee Chairman Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) and Senate Agriculture Committee Ranking Member Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) are working tirelessly to ensure these provisions are workable for all family farms in all regions. They seem to be making great progress in this area on reaching compromises that will not unfairly discriminate against farms due to the crops they grow, the size of the farm, or the family members that are involved in the farm.¶ "Due to the progress made this week, we are increasingly optimistic that a workable and effective Farm Bill for the rice industry will be approved by Congress in the very near future," said Reece Langley, USA Rice's vice president for government affairs. "Passage of this bill will finally help bring some certainty to producers, their lenders, and other industry members."

#### Plan causes conservative backlash

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### GOP leadership will push off Farm Bill if the plan causes controversy- can’t muster political will on tough votes back to back

Jake Sherman covers Congress for POLITICO. He got his start in journalism in high school at The Stamford Advocate, where he became a pro at taking box scores for the sports section. He majored in journalism at George Washington University in D.C. but more accurately got a degree at The GW Hatchet, where he was the men’s basketball beat writer before becoming sports editor and, subsequently, editor-in-chief.¶ During summers, Jake interned at The Journal News (N.Y.) and in the Washington bureaus of the Minneapolis Star Tribune and Newsweek. After finishing a master’s in journalism at Columbia University, Jake became an intern in the D.C. bureau of The Wall Street Journal and Carrie Budoff Brown started in journalism at the York Daily Record in the summer before her freshman year in college. She worked as an editor at The Daily Targum, the student-run newspaper of Rutgers University, and interned at the Richmond Times Dispatch and the New York Times. She worked as a staff writer at the Hartford Courant and the Philadelphia Inquirer before arriving at POLITICO on the day it launched in 2007.¶ Budoff Brown is now a White House reporter who focuses on the intersection of policy and politics in the administration and on Capitol Hill. She has covered the Senate, the 2008 Obama campaign, the health care overhaul bill, Wall Street reform and various tax cut battles in Congress. Politico, 8-28-2013 <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/immigration-reform-95980.html#ixzz2dIFeo4Sb>

Immigration reform advocates have a new enemy: the congressional calendar.¶ Fall’s fiscal fights have lined up in a way that could delay immigration reform until 2014, multiple senior House Republican leadership aides tell POLITICO, imperiling the effort’s prospects before the midterm elections.¶ The mid-October debt ceiling deadline — an earlier-than-expected target laid out Monday by Treasury Secretary Jack Lew — is changing the House GOP leadership’s plans to pass immigration bills that month.¶ “If we have to deal with the debt limit earlier, it doesn’t change the overall dynamics of the debate, but — just in terms of timing — it might make it harder to find time for immigration bills in October,” one House Republican leadership aide said.¶ That’s not the only scheduling challenge. There are fewer than 40 congressional working days until the end of 2013 — the unofficial deadline for passing immigration reform — and they’ll present some of the most politically challenging votes for lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. It will be difficult to add immigration reform to the list, senior aides say.¶ Government funding runs dry on Sept. 30. The nine days the House is in session that month will be crowded with the debate over the continuing resolution to keep the government operating. The GOP leadership will have to reconcile the screams from conservatives who want to use the bill to defund Obamacare with their own desire to avoid a government shutdown. Of course, anything the House approves would need to pass the Democratic-controlled Senate, which will ignore attempts to weaken the law.¶ Immigration reform isn’t certain to die if it slips into 2014, some in GOP leadership say. But major progress must be made in 2013 as it would be too difficult for the House to chart a course in 2014, an election year.¶ At a fundraiser in Idaho on Monday, Speaker John Boehner predicted a “whale of a fight” over the debt ceiling. That skirmish will surface in October. The House is in session for 14 days during that month, but there is certain to be a good deal of debate over passing a bill that would extend the nation’s borrowing authority.¶ GOP leadership is mulling its initial negotiating position, which is sure to include some changes to entitlements, energy policy and the health care law. Boehner’s leadership team also seems open to discussing ways to soften the blow of the sequester in October, which would add yet another explosive issue to the mix.¶ The White House refuses to negotiate with Republicans over the debt limit, leaving little clarity on how the standoff gets resolved — and when.¶ “Congress has already authorized funding, committed us to make expenditures,” Lew told CNBC Tuesday. “We’re now in the place where the only question is will we pay the bills that the United States has incurred. The only way to do that is for Congress to act — for it to act quickly.”¶ A senior administration official said Tuesday that the increasingly crowded fall calendar was why Obama pressed the House to deal with immigration before the August recess. But the Republican leaders need to make time for it, the official said, and they should want to do it sooner rather than later because the pressure from the president and others isn’t going to let up.¶ But the scarce legislative days and the fiscal battles will be welcome to some House Republicans squeamish about voting on immigration reform. There is little support for passing the kind of comprehensive bill approved by the Senate. But even the piecemeal approach being pushed by the House leadership has its fair share of skeptics in the GOP conference.¶ November could provide a window for immigration reform — but two dynamics may interfere.¶ The debt-ceiling deadline could slip to November if tax receipts come in stronger than expected. If Congress votes on the debt ceiling during the eight-day November session, the Republican leadership is skeptical that it would be easy to turn around and vote on even a pared-back version of immigration reform.¶ The will just won’t be there, some aides say. A similar situation played out earlier this year, when Boehner delayed in January a vote on Hurricane Sandy relief because it came too soon after the tough vote when Congress raised taxes to resolve the fiscal cliff.¶ December will likely bring another government funding debate. The current plan for September is to pass a continuing resolution that lasts until Dec. 15, setting up another year-end spending fight. The House is scheduled to be in session for just eight days in December before leaving for the holidays.¶ Frank Sharry, executive director of America’s Voice, said the new debt limit deadline “is likely to push consideration of immigration to the latter part of October at the earliest.”¶ But Sharry and Angela Kelley, vice president for immigration policy at the Center for American Progress, said the House won’t be able to use the fiscal fights as an excuse.¶ “There are some in leadership who are going to look for any reason not to act,” Kelley said. “There will be a space where this issue is going to have to move. It’s not going to go away because other matters.”

#### New farm bill key to food prices and econ

Nelson 10/17/13 [Joe Nelson, writer for WEAU news, “Obama, ag industry waiting for new Farm bill,” <http://www.weau.com/home/headlines/Obama-ag-industry-waiting-for-new-Farm-Bill-228259521.html>]

With the government shutdown over, farmers are still waiting for a deal to be made.¶ President Obama listed the farm bill as one of his top priorities to address, which could protect farmers and low income families.¶ “We should pass a farm bill, one that American farmers and ranchers can depend on, one that protects vulnerable children and adults in times of need, one that gives rural communities opportunities to grow and the long-term certainty that they deserve. Again, the Senate's already passed a solid bipartisan bill. It's got support from democrats and republicans. It's sitting in the House waiting for passage. If House republicans have ideas that they think would improve the farm bill, let's see them. Let's negotiate. What are we waiting for? Let's get this done,” Obama said.¶ Farmers said if they struggle without a farm bill, it could cause food prices to spike, force some out of the industry and damage the economy.¶ “If the milk price falls below a certain level, the Farm bill does help support farmers during a time of an economic crisis when prices drop too low,” Chippewa County U.W. Extension Crops and Soils Educator, Jerry Clark¶ The current, five-year Farm bill was temporarily extended, but both farmers and Clark said with much to lose, a new one is needed.¶ “Any time we can get the new bill passed, it's definitely going to help because there's always new changes in agriculture, as far as commodities or practices that need to be implemented,” Clark said. “So those types of things should be passed to keep up with the current trends in agriculture.¶ Durand corn and soybean farmer and Value Implement dealer TJ Poeschel says not having a new farm bill and reverting to a bill from 1949 could cut down profits or even force some farmers to quit or retire.

#### Econ decline causes global conflict - studies

Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### 1NC K

#### Globalization makes extinction inevitable- social and environmental factors build positive feedbacks create a cascade of destruction - only massive social reorganization produces sustainable change

**Ehrenfeld, Rutgers biology professor, 2005**

(David, “The Environmental Limits to Globalization”, Conservation Biology Vol. 19 No. 2, ebsco)

Ehrenfeld ‘5,

The overall environmental changes brought about or accelerated by globalization are, however, much easier to describe for the near future, even if the long-term outcomes are still obscure. Climate will continue to change rapidly (Watson 2002); cheap energy and other resources (Youngquist 1997; Hall et al. 2003; Smil 2003), including fresh water (Aldhous 2003; Gleick 2004), will diminish and disappear at an accelerating rate; agricultural and farm communities will deteriorate further while we lose more genetic diversity among crops and farm animals (Fowler & Mooney 1990; Bailey & Lappé 2002; Wirzba 2003); biodiversity will decline faster as terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems are damaged (Heywood 1995); harmful exotic species will become ever more numerous (Mooney & Hobbs 2000); old and new diseases of plants, animals, and humans will continue to proliferate (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1995-present; Lashley & Durham 2002); and more of the great ocean fisheries will become economically—and occasionally biologically—extinct (Myers & Worm 2003). Although critics have taken issue with many of these forecasts (Lomborg 2001; Hollander 2003), the critics' arguments seem more political than scientific; the data they muster in support of their claims are riddled with errors, significant omissions, and misunderstandings of environmental processes (Orr 2002). Indeed, these environmental changes are demonstrably and frighteningly real. And because of these and related changes, one social prediction can be made with assurance: globalization is creating an environment that will prove hostile to its own survival. This is not a political statement or a moral judgment. It is not the same as saying that globalization ought to be stopped. The enlightened advocates of globalization claim that globalization could give the poorest residents of the poorest countries a chance to enjoy a decent income. And the enlightened opponents of globalization assert that the damage done by globalization to local communities everywhere, and the increasing gap it causes between the rich and the poor, far outweigh the small amount of good globalization may do. The debate is vitally important, but the fate of globalization is unlikely to be determined by who wins it. Al Gore remarked about the political impasse over global warming and the current rapid melting of the world's glaciers: “Glaciers don't give a damn about politics. They just reflect reality” (Herbert 2004). The same inexorable environmental reality is even now drawing the curtains on globalization. Often minimized in the United States, this reality is already painfully obvious in China, which is experiencing the most rapid expansion related to globalization. Nearly every issue of China Daily, the national English-language newspaper, features articles on the environmental effects of globalization. Will efforts in China to rein in industrial expansion, energy consumption, and environmental pollution succeed (Fu 2004; Qin 2004; Xu 2004)? Will the desperate attempts of Chinese authorities to mitigate the impact of rapid industrialization on the disastrously scarce supplies of fresh water be effective (Li 2004; Liang 2004)? The environmental anxiety is palpable and pervasive. The environmental effects of globalization cannot be measured by simple numbers like the gross domestic product or unemployment rate. But even without such summary statistics, there are so many examples of globalization's impact, some obvious, some less so, that a convincing argument about its effects and trends can be made. Among the environmental impacts of globalization, perhaps the most significant is its fostering of the excessive use of energy, with the attendant consequences. This surge in energy use was inevitable, once the undeveloped four-fifths of the world adopted the energy-wasting industrialization model of the developed fifth, and as goods that once were made locally began to be transported around the world at a tremendous cost of energy. China's booming production, largely the result of its surging global exports, has caused a huge increase in the mining and burning of coal and the building of giant dams for more electric power, an increase of power that in only the first 8 months of 2003 amounted to 16% (Bradsher 2003; Guo 2004). The many environmental effects of the coal burning include, most importantly, global warming. Fossil-fuel-driven climate change seems likely to result in a rise in sea level, massive extinction of species, agricultural losses from regional shifts in temperature and rainfall, and, possibly, alteration of major ocean currents, with secondary climatic change. Other side effects of coal burning are forest decline, especially from increased nitrogen deposition; acidification of freshwater and terrestrial ecosystems from nitrogen and sulfur compounds; and a major impact on human health from polluted air. Dams, China's alternative method of producing electricity without burning fossil fuels, themselves cause massive environmental changes. These changes include fragmentation of river channels; loss of floodplains, riparian zones, and adjacent wetlands; deterioration of irrigated terrestrial environments and their surface waters; deterioration and loss of river deltas and estuaries; aging and reduction of continental freshwater runoff to oceans; changes in nutrient cycling; impacts on biodiversity; methylmercury contamination of food webs; and greenhouse gas emissions from reservoirs. The impoundment of water in reservoirs at high latitudes in the northern hemisphere has even caused a small but measurable increase in the speed of the earth's rotation and a change in the planet's axis (Rosenberg et al. 2000; Vörösmarty & Sahagian 2000). Moreover, the millions of people displaced by reservoirs such as the one behind China's Three Gorges Dam have their own environmental impacts as they struggle to survive in unfamiliar and often unsuitable places. Despite the importance of coal and hydropower in China's booming economy, the major factor that enables globalization to flourish around the world—even in China—is still cheap oil. Cheap oil runs the ships, planes, trucks, cars, tractors, harvesters, earth-moving equipment, and chain saws that globalization needs; cheap oil lifts the giant containers with their global cargos off the container ships onto the waiting flatbeds; cheap oil even mines and processes the coal, grows and distills the biofuels, drills the gas wells, and builds the nuclear power plants while digging and refining the uranium ore that keeps them operating. Paradoxically, the global warming caused by this excessive burning of oil is exerting negative feedback on the search for more oil to replace dwindling supplies. The search for Arctic oil has been slowed by recent changes in the Arctic climate. Arctic tundra has to be frozen and snow-covered to allow the heavy seismic vehicles to prospect for underground oil reserves, or long-lasting damage to the landscape results. The recent Arctic warming trend has reduced the number of days that vehicles can safely explore: from 187 in 1969 to 103 in 2002 (Revkin 2004). Globalization affects so many environmental systems in so many ways that negative interactions of this sort are frequent and usually unpredictable. Looming over the global economy is the imminent disappearance of cheap oil. There is some debate about when global oil production will peak—many of the leading petroleum geologists predict the peak will occur in this decade, possibly in the next two or three years (Campbell 1997; Kerr 1998; Duncan & Youngquist 1999; Holmes & Jones 2003; Appenzeller 2004; ASPO 2004; Bakhtiari 2004; Gerth 2004)—but it is abundantly clear that the remaining untapped reserves and alternatives such as oil shale, tar sands, heavy oil, and biofuels are economically and energetically no substitute for the cheap oil that comes pouring out of the ground in the Arabian Peninsula and a comparatively few other places on Earth (Youngquist 1997). Moreover, the hydrogen economy and other high-tech solutions to the loss of cheap oil are clouded by serious, emerging technological doubts about feasibility and safety, and a realistic fear that, if they can work, they will not arrive in time to rescue our globalized industrial civilization (Grant 2003; Tromp et al. 2003; Romm 2004). Even energy conservation, which we already know how to implement both technologically and as part of an abstemious lifestyle, is likely to be no friend to globalization, because it reduces consumption of all kinds, and consumption is what globalization is all about. In a keynote address to the American Geological Society, a noted expert on electric power networks, Richard Duncan (2001), predicted widespread, permanent electric blackouts by 2012, and the end of industrial, globalized civilization by 2030. The energy crunch is occurring now. According to Duncan, per capita energy production in the world has already peaked—that happened in 1979—and has declined since that date. In a more restrained evaluation of the energy crisis, Charles Hall and colleagues (2003) state that: The world is not about to run out of hydrocarbons, and perhaps it is not going to run out of oil from unconventional sources any time soon. What will be difficult to obtain is cheap petroleum, because what is left is an enormous amount of low-grade hydrocarbons, which are likely to be much more expensive financially, energetically, politically and especially environmentally. Nuclear power still has “important…technological, economic, environmental and public safety problems,” they continue, and at the moment “renewable energies present a mixed bag of opportunities.” Their solution? Forget about the more expensive and dirtier hydrocarbons such as tar sands. We need a major public policy intervention to foster a crash program of public and private investment in research on renewable energy technologies. Perhaps this will happen—necessity does occasionally bring about change. But I do not see renewable energy coming in time or in sufficient magnitude to save globalization. Sunlight, wind, geothermal energy, and biofuels, necessary as they are to develop, cannot replace cheap oil at the current rate of use without disastrous environmental side effects. These renewable alternatives can only power a nonglobalized civilization that consumes less energy (Ehrenfeld 2003b). Already, as the output of the giant Saudi oil reserves has started to fall (Gerth 2004) and extraction of the remaining oil is becoming increasingly costly, oil prices are climbing and the strain is being felt by other energy sources. For example, the production of natural gas, which fuels more than half of U.S. homes, is declining in the United States, Canada, and Mexico as wells are exhausted. In both the United States and Canada, intensive new drilling is being offset by high depletion rates, and gas consumption increases yearly. In 2002 the United States imported 15% of its gas from Canada, more than half of Canada's total gas production. However, with Canada's gas production decreasing and with the “stranded” gas reserves in the United States and Canadian Arctic regions unavailable until pipelines are built 5–10 years from now, the United States is likely to become more dependent on imported liquid natural gas (LNG). Here are some facts to consider. Imports of LNG in the United States increased from 39 billion cubic feet in 1990 to 169 billion cubic feet in 2002, which was still <1% of U.S. natural gas consumption. The largest natural gas field in the world is in the tiny Persian Gulf state of Qatar. Gas is liquefied near the site of production by cooling it to −260°F (−162°C), shipped in special refrigerated trains to waiting LNG ships, and then transported to an LNG terminal, where it is off-loaded, regasified, and piped to consumers. Each LNG transport ship costs a half billion dollars. An LNG terminal costs one billion dollars. There are four LNG terminals in the United States, none in Canada or Mexico. Approximately 30 additional LNG terminal sites to supply the United States are being investigated or planned, including several in the Bahamas, with pipelines to Florida. On 19 January 2004, the LNG terminal at Skikda, Algeria, blew up with tremendous force, flattening much of the port and killing 30 people. The Skikda terminal, renovated by Halliburton in the late 1990s, will cost $800 million to $1 billion to replace. All major ports in the United States are heavily populated, and there is strong environmental opposition to putting terminals at some sites in the United States. Draw your own conclusions about LNG as a source of cheap energy (Youngquist & Duncan 2003; Romero 2004). From LNG to coal gasification to oil shale to nuclear fission to breeder reactors to fusion to renewable energy, even to improvements in efficiency of energy use (Browne 2004), our society looks from panacea to panacea to feed the ever-increasing demands of globalization. But no one solution or combination of solutions will suffice to meet this kind of consumption. In the words of Vaclav Smil (2003): Perhaps the evolutionary imperative of our species is to ascend a ladder of ever-increasing energy throughputs, never to consider seriously any voluntary consumption limits and stay on this irrational course until it will be too late to salvage the irreplaceable underpinnings of biospheric services that will be degraded and destroyed by our progressing use of energy and materials. Among the many other environmental effects of globalization, one that is both obvious and critically important is reduced genetic and cultural diversity in agriculture. As the representatives of the petrochemical and pharmaceutical industries' many subsidiary seed corporations sell their patented seeds in more areas previously isolated from global trade, farmers are dropping their traditional crop varieties, the reservoir of our accumulated genetic agricultural wealth, in favor of a few, supposedly high-yielding, often chemical-dependent seeds. The Indian agricultural scientist H. Sudarshan (2002) has provided a typical example. He noted that Over the last half century, India has probably grown over 30,000 different, indigenous varieties or landraces of rice. This situation has, in the last 20 years, changed drastically and it is predicted that in another 20 years, rice diversity will be reduced to 50 varieties, with the top 10 accounting for over three-quarters of the sub-continent's rice acreage. With so few varieties left, where will conventional plant breeders and genetic engineers find the genes for disease and pest resistance, environmental adaptations, and plant quality and vigor that we will surely need? A similar loss has been seen in varieties of domestic animals. Of the 3831 breeds of ass, water buffalo, cattle, goat, horse, pig, and sheep recorded in the twentieth century, at least 618 had become extinct by the century's end, and 475 of the remainder were rare. Significantly, the countries with the highest ratios of surviving breeds per million people are those that are most peripheral and remote from global commerce (Hall & Ruane 1993). Unfortunately, with globalization, remoteness is no longer tenable. Here is a poignant illustration. Rural Haitians have traditionally raised a morphotype of long-snouted, small black pig known as the Creole pig. Adapted to the Haitian climate, Creole pigs had very low maintenance requirements, and were mainstays of soil fertility and the rural economy. In 1982 and 1983, most of these pigs were deliberately killed as part of swine disease control efforts required to integrate Haiti into the hemispheric economy. They were replaced by pigs from Iowa that needed clean drinking water, roofed pigpens, and expensive, imported feed. The substitution was a disaster. Haitian peasants, the hemisphere's poorest, lost an estimated $600 million. Haiti's ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (2000), who, whatever his faults, understood the environmental and social effects of globalization, wrote There was a 30% drop in enrollment in rural schools… a dramatic decline in the protein consumption in rural Haiti, a devastating decapitalization of the peasant economy and an incalculable negative impact on Haiti's soil and agricultural productivity. The Haitian peasantry has not recovered to this day…. For many peasants the extermination of the Creole pigs was their first experience of globalization. The sale of Mexican string beans and South African apples in Michigan and Minnesota in January is not without consequences. The globalization of food has led to the introduction of “high-input” agricultural methods in many less-developed countries, with sharply increasing use of fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides, fungicides, irrigation pumps, mechanical equipment, and energy. There has been a correspondingly sharp decline in farmland biodiversity—including birds, invertebrates, and wild crop relatives—much of which is critically important to agriculture through ecosystem services or as reservoirs of useful genes (Benton et al. 2003). The combination of heavy fertilizer use along with excessive irrigation has resulted in toxic accumulations of salt, nitrates, and pesticides ruining soils all over the world, along with the dangerous drawdown and contamination of underground reserves of fresh water (Hillel 1991; Kaiser 2004; Sugden et al. 2004). Although population growth has been responsible for some of this agricultural intensification, much has been catalyzed by globalization (Wright 1990). Aquaculture is another agriculture-related activity. Fish and shellfish farming—much of it for export—has more than doubled in the past 15 years. This industry's tremendous requirements for fish meal and fish oil to use as food and its degradation of coastal areas are placing a great strain on marine ecosystems (Naylor et al. 2000). Other unanticipated problems are occurring. For instance, the Scottish fisheries biologist Alexander Murray and his colleagues (2002) report that infectious salmon anemia … is caused by novel virulent strains of a virus that has adapted to intensive aquacultural practices and has exploited the associated [ship] traffic to spread both locally and internationally…. Extensive ship traffic and lack of regulation increase the risk of spreading disease to animals raised for aquaculture and to other animals in marine environments…. [and underscore] the potential role of shipping in the global transport of zoonotic pathogens. The reduction of diversity in agriculture is paralleled by a loss and reshuffling of wild species. The global die-off of species now occurring, unprecedented in its rapidity, is of course only partly the result of globalization, but globalization is a major factor in many extinctions. It accelerates species loss in several ways. First, it increases the numbers of exotic species carried by the soaring plane, ship, rail, and truck traffic of global trade. Second, it is responsible for the adverse effects of ecotourism on wild flora and fauna (Ananthaswamy 2004). And third, it promotes the development and exploitation of populations and natural areas to satisfy the demands of global trade, including, in addition to the agricultural and energy-related disruptions already mentioned, logging, over-fishing of marine fisheries, road building, and mining. To give just one example, from 1985 to 2001, 56% of Indonesian Borneo's (Kalimantan) “protected” lowland forest areas—many of them remote and sparsely populated—were intensively logged, primarily to supply international timber markets (Curran et al. 2004). Surely one of the most significant impacts of globalization on wild species and the ecosystems in which they live has been the increase in introductions of invasive species (Vitousek et al. 1996; Mooney & Hobbs 2000). Two examples are zebra mussels (Dreissena polymorpha), which came to the Great Lakes in the mid-1980s in the ballast water of cargo ships from Europe, and Asian longhorn beetles (Anoplophera glabripennis), which arrived in the United States in the early 1990s in wood pallets and crates used to transfer cargo shipped from China and Korea. Zebra mussels, which are eliminating native mussels and altering lake ecosystems, clog the intake pipes of waterworks and power plants. The Asian longhorn beetle now seems poised to cause heavy tree loss (especially maples [Acer sp.]) in the hardwood forests of eastern North America. Along the U.S. Pacific coast, oaks (Quercus sp.) and tanoaks (Lithocarpus densiflorus) are being killed by sudden oak death, caused by a new, highly invasive fungal disease organism (Phytophthora ramorum), which is probably also an introduced species that was spread by the international trade in horticultural plants (Rizzo & Garbelotto 2003). Estimates of the annual cost of the damage caused by invasive species in the United States range from $5.5 billion to $115 billion. The zebra mussel alone, just one of a great many terrestrial, freshwater, and marine exotic animals, plants, and pathogens, has been credited with more than $5 billion of damage since its introduction (Mooney & Drake 1986; Cox 1999). Invasive species surely rank among the principal economic and ecological limiting factors for globalization. Some introduced species directly affect human health, either as vectors of disease or as the disease organisms themselves. For example, the Asian tiger mosquito (Aedes albopictus), a vector for dengue and yellow fevers, St. Louis and LaCrosse encephalitis viruses, and West Nile virus, was most likely introduced in used truck tires imported from Asia to Texas in the 1980s and has spread widely since then. Discussion of this and other examples is beyond the scope of this article. Even the partial control of accidental and deliberate species introductions requires stringent, well-funded governmental regulation in cooperation with the public and with business. Many introductions of alien species cannot be prevented, but some can, and successful interventions to prevent the spread of introduced species can have significant environmental and economic benefits. To give just one example, western Australia has shown that government and industry can cooperate to keep travelers and importers from bringing harmful invasive species across their borders. The western Australian HortGuard and GrainGuard programs integrate public education; rapid and effective access to information; targeted surveillance, which includes preborder, border, and postborder activities; and farm and regional biosecurity systems (Sharma 2004). Similar programs exist in New Zealand. But there is only so much that governments can do in the face of massive global trade. Some of the significant effects of globalization on wildlife are quite subtle. Mazzoni et al. (2003) reported that the newly appearing fungal disease chytridiomycosis (caused by Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis), which appears to be the causative agent for a number of mass die-offs and extinctions of amphibians on several continents, is probably being spread by the international restaurant trade in farmed North American bullfrogs (Rana catesbeiana). These authors state: “Our findings suggest that international trade may play a key role in the global dissemination of this and other emerging infectious diseases of wildlife.” Even more unexpected findings were described in 2002 by Alexander et al., who noted that expansion of ecotourism and other consequences of globalization are increasing contact between free-ranging wildlife and humans, resulting in the first recorded introduction of a primary human pathogen, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, into wild populations of banded mongooses (Mungos mungo) in Botswana and suricates (Suricata suricatta) in South Africa. The known effects of globalization on the environment are numerous and highly significant. Many others are undoubtedly unknown. Given these circumstances, the first question that suggests itself is: Will globalization, as we see it now, remain a permanent state of affairs (Rees 2002; Ehrenfeld 2003a)? The principal environmental side effects of globalization—climate change, resource exhaustion (particularly cheap energy), damage to agroecosystems, and the spread of exotic species, including pathogens (plant, animal, and human)—are sufficient to make this economic system unstable and short-lived. The socioeconomic consequences of globalization are likely to do the same. In my book The Arrogance of Humanism (1981), I claimed that our ability to manage global systems, which depends on our being able to predict the results of the things we do, or even to understand the systems we have created, has been greatly exaggerated. Much of our alleged control is science fiction; it doesn't work because of theoretical limits that we ignore at our peril. We live in a dream world in which reality testing is something we must never, never do, lest we awake. In 1984 Charles Perrow explored the reasons why we have trouble predicting what so many of our own created systems will do, and why they surprise us so unpleasantly while we think we are managing them. In his book Normal Accidents, which does not concern globalization, he listed the critical characteristics of some of today's complex systems. They are highly interlinked, so a change in one part can affect many others, even those that seem quite distant. Results of some processes feed back on themselves in unexpected ways. The controls of the system often interact with each other unpredictably. We have only indirect ways of finding out what is happening inside the system. And we have an incomplete understanding of some of the system's processes. His example of such a system is a nuclear power plant, and this, he explained, is why system-wide accidents in nuclear plants cannot be predicted or eliminated by system design. I would argue that globalization is a similar system, also subject to catastrophic accidents, many of them environmental—events that we cannot define until after they have occurred, and perhaps not even then. The comparatively few commentators who have predicted the collapse of globalization have generally given social reasons to support their arguments. These deserve some consideration here, if only because the environmental and social consequences of globalization interact so strongly with each other. In 1998, the British political economist John Gray, giving scant attention to environmental factors, nevertheless came to the conclusion that globalization is unstable and will be short-lived. He said, “There is nothing in today's global market that buffers it against the social strains arising from highly uneven economic development within and between the world's diverse societies.” The result, Gray states, is that “The combination of [an] unceasing stream of new technologies, unfettered market competition and weak or fractured social institutions” has weakened both sovereign states and multinational corporations in their ability to control important events. Note that Gray claims that not only nations but also multinational corporations, which are widely touted as controlling the world, are being weakened by globalization. This idea may come as a surprise, considering the growth of multinationals in the past few decades, but I believe it is true. Neither governments nor giant corporations are even remotely capable of controlling the environmental or social forces released by globalization, without first controlling globalization itself. Two of the social critics of globalization with the most dire predictions about its doom are themselves masters of the process. The late Sir James Goldsmith, billionaire financier, wrote in 1994, It must surely be a mistake to adopt an economic policy which makes you rich if you eliminate your national workforce and transfer production abroad, and which bankrupts you if you continue to employ your own people…. It is the poor in the rich countries who will subsidize the rich in the poor countries. This will have a serious impact on the social cohesion of nations. Another free-trade billionaire, George Soros, said much the same thing in 1995: “The collapse of the global marketplace would be a traumatic event with unimaginable consequences. Yet I find it easier to imagine than the continuation of the present regime.” How much more powerful these statements are if we factor in the environment! As globalization collapses, what will happen to people, biodiversity, and ecosystems? With respect to people, the gift of prophecy is not required to answer this question. What will happen depends on where you are and how you live. Many citizens of the Third World are still comparatively self-sufficient; an unknown number of these will survive the breakdown of globalization and its attendant chaos. In the developed world, there are also people with resources of self-sufficiency and a growing understanding of the nature of our social and environmental problems, which may help them bridge the years of crisis. Some species are adaptable; some are not. For the nonhuman residents of Earth, not all news will be bad. Who would have predicted that wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo), one of the wiliest and most evasive of woodland birds, extinct in New Jersey 50 years ago, would now be found in every county of this the most densely populated state, and even, occasionally, in adjacent Manhattan? Who would have predicted that black bears (Ursus americanus), also virtually extinct in the state in the mid-twentieth century, would now number in the thousands (Ehrenfeld 2001)? Of course these recoveries are unusual—rare bright spots in a darker landscape. Finally, a few ecological systems may survive in a comparatively undamaged state; most will be stressed to the breaking point, directly or indirectly, by many environmental and social factors interacting unpredictably. Lady Luck, as always, will have much to say. In his book The Collapse of Complex Societies, the archaeologist Joseph Tainter (1988) notes that collapse, which has happened to all past empires, inevitably results in human systems of lower complexity and less specialization, less centralized control, lower economic activity, less information flow, lower population levels, less trade, and less redistribution of resources. All of these changes are inimical to globalization. This less-complex, less-globalized condition is probably what human societies will be like when the dust settles. I do not think, however, that we can make such specific predictions about the ultimate state of the environment after globalization, because we have never experienced anything like this exceptionally rapid, global environmental damage before. History and science have little to tell us in this situation. The end of the current economic system and the transition to a postglobalized state is and will be accompanied by a desperate last raid on resources and a chaotic flurry of environmental destruction whose results cannot possibly be told in advance. All one can say is that the surviving species, ecosystems, and resources will be greatly impoverished compared with what we have now, and our descendants will not thank us for having adopted, however briefly, an economic system that consumed their inheritance and damaged their planet so wantonly. Environment is a true bottom line—concern for its condition must trump all purely economic growth strategies if both the developed and developing nations are to survive and prosper. Awareness of the environmental limits that globalized industrial society denies or ignores should not, however, bring us to an extreme position of environmental determinism. Those whose preoccupations with modern civilization's very real social problems cause them to reject or minimize the environmental constraints discussed here (Hollander 2003) are guilty of seeing only half the picture. Environmental scientists sometimes fall into the same error. It is tempting to see the salvation of civilization and environment solely in terms of technological improvements in efficiency of energy extraction and use, control of pollution, conservation of water, and regulation of environmentally harmful activities. But such needed developments will not be sufficient—or may not even occur—without corresponding social change, including an end to human population growth and the glorification of consumption, along with the elimination of economic mechanisms that increase the gap between rich and poor. The environmental and social problems inherent in globalization are completely interrelated—any attempt to treat them as separate entities is unlikely to succeed in easing the transition to a postglobalized world. Integrated change that combines environmental awareness, technological innovation, and an altered world view is the only answer to the life-threatening problems exacerbated by globalization (Ehrenfeld 2003b).

#### Our alternative is to decolonize economic engagement. Questioning the politics of space and knowledge that make engagement an economic tool of manipulation is key to sustainable development.

**Walsh, Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 2012**

(Catherine, “The Politics of Naming”, Cultural Studies, 26.1, Project Muse)

Cultural Studies, in our project, is constructed and understood as more than a field of ‘study’. It is broadly understand as a formation, a field of possibility and expression. And it is constructed as a space of encounter between disciplines and intellectual, political and ethical projects that seek to combat what Alberto Moreiras called the impoverishment of thought driven by divisions (disciplinary, epistemological, geographic, etc.) and the socio-political-cultural fragmentation that increasingly makes social change and intervention appear to be divided forces (Moreiras 2001). As such, Cultural Studies is conceived as a place of plural-, inter-, transand in-disciplinary (or undisciplined) critical thinking that takes as major concern the intimate relationships between culture, knowledge, politics and economics mentioned earlier, and that sees the problems of the region as both local and global. It is a space from which to search for ways of thinking, knowing, comprehending, feeling and acting that permit us to intervene and influence: a field that makes possible convergence and articulation, particularly between efforts, practices, knowledge and projects that focus on more global justice, on differences (epistemic, ontological, existential, of gender, ethnicity, class, race, nation, among others) constructed as inequalities within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism. It is a place that seeks answers, encourages intervention and engenders projects and proposals. It is in this frame of understanding and practice in our Ph.D. programme in Latin-American Cultural Studies at the Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var, that this broad description-definition continues to take on more concrete characteristics. Here I can identify three that stand out: the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial. The inter-cultural has been and still is a central axis in the struggles and processes of social change in the Andean region. Its critical meaning was first affirmed near the end of the 1980s in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s political project. Here inter-culturality was positioned as an ideological principal grounded in the urgent need for a radical transformation of social structures, institutions and relationships, not only for indigenous peoples but also for society as a whole. Since then, inter-culturality has marked a social, political, ethical project and process that is also epistemological;6 a project and a process that seek to re-found the bases of the nation and national culture, understood as homogenous and mono-cultural. Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established, but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges, practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies, and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living. In a similar fashion, the inter-epistemic focuses on the need to question, interrupt and transgress the Euro-USA-centric epistemological frameworks that dominate Latin-American universities and even some Cultural Studies programmes. To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a necessary and essential step, both in de-colonization and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of inverting the geopolitics of knowledge, with placing attention on the historically subjugated and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogical methodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodologicalpedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the LatinAmerican university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with LatinAmerican reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the frameworks and logics of our thinking, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of naming.

### 1NC CP

#### Using its licensing authority and enforcement discretion, the United States Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control should exempt the enforcement of sanctions on agricultural imports on Cuba from enforcement under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

#### First, the counterplan solves via specific exemptions — OFAC has broad discretion over sanctions enforcement.

Golumbic and Ruff 13 — Court E. Golumbic, Managing Director and Global Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Bribery and Government Sanctions Compliance Officer at Goldman Sachs & Co., Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, former Assistant United States Attorney with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and Robert S. Ruff III, Associate in the Securities Litigation practice group at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 2013 (“Leveraging the Three Core Competencies: How OFAC Licensing Optimizes Holistic Sanctions,” *North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation* (38 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 729), Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

2. Ability to Mitigate Collateral Damage

Because OFAC prefers to formulate its sanctions program **broadly**, its economic sanctions can affect the lives of **unintended targets**, such as ordinary citizens of foreign countries that have no influence in their sanctioned government. n347 The broad reach of U.S. sanctions can also unnecessarily put U.S. citizens and companies at a competitive disadvantage, undermine international support for the sanctions programs, and even **undermine the policy objectives of the programs**. n348 One way in which OFAC **mitigates** [\*792] **the collateral damage** of its holistic sanctions is by **issuing licenses** that permit U.S. citizens to export food and medical supplies n349 and provide humanitarian aid n350 to people in sanctioned countries. In an effort to avoid placing private enterprises at an unnecessary competitive disadvantage, which can damage U.S. influence internationally and U.S. interests as a whole, OFAC may also **allow certain activities** from an otherwise sanctioned country. n351 Additionally, OFAC issues licenses to avoid interfering with the legitimate activities of international and charitable organizations and to permit U.S. persons to participate in such organizations. n352 By licensing these types of activities and transactions, OFAC **focuses its sanctions and the punitive consequences thereof**, to the extent possible, **on those in a position to produce the desired change**, rather than on **innocent civilians and businesses**. n353

#### Second, the counterplan solves quickly and without political fallout — it doesn’t require legislative or regulatory action.

Golumbic and Ruff 13 — Court E. Golumbic, Managing Director and Global Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Bribery and Government Sanctions Compliance Officer at Goldman Sachs & Co., Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, former Assistant United States Attorney with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and Robert S. Ruff III, Associate in the Securities Litigation practice group at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 2013 (“Leveraging the Three Core Competencies: How OFAC Licensing Optimizes Holistic Sanctions,” *North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation* (38 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 729), Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

3. Adaptability

The third core competency of OFAC's licensing practices is the ability to **adapt** a particular sanctions program **quickly** in response to political or circumstantial changes. n388 In situations where sanctions goals can change with the tides of revolution, the **slow march of legislative and rulemaking processes** may be incapable of producing **a timely response**. Sanctions targeting government-owned or government-operated entities may need to be **lifted** in response to a positive regime change or re-imposed in the event that the new government fails. n389 OFAC often utilizes **general licenses** to manage these fast-paced scenarios, either by **easing sanctions through license adoption** or strengthening sanctions through license revocation. n390 By issuing or revoking general licenses, OFAC can react to the changing political circumstances of a targeted country **without requiring a regulatory overhaul or the signing or withdrawal of an executive order**. n391

### Solvency

#### Cuba won’t cooperate after the plan

**Starr, USC IR professor, 2013**

(Pamela, “As Cuba Changes, U.S. Policy Does Not”, May, <https://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=539>)

Obstacles to improved bilateral relations, however, are not limited to the U.S. side of the Florida Straits. Our meetings suggested at least three reasons why, despite all their public protestations, the Cuban government may not place an end to the “blockade” at the top of their to-do list: the impact of history; the profound asymmetry of power between the two nations; and the utility of U.S. hostility in unifying the nation against threats to the survival of the Revolution. The history of U.S.-Cuban relations has taught Cuba to be very wary of the United States. Over a half century of hostility has taught each side to mistrust the other, but Cuban suspicion of the United States runs deeper. In part, this is because U.S. policy toward Cuba since 1961 has been geared toward removing the Cuban government from power, and in part it is because of U.S.-Cuban relations even before the Cuban Revolution. From the Cuban perspective, Cuba did not win its independence in 1898, as Americans learn in their history books, but in 1959 as a result of the Revolution. The U.S. goal in the first Cuban War of Independence (what we in the United States call the Spanish-American War) was the separation of Cuba from Spanish colonial domination, followed by its transformation into a de facto colony of the United States. Our Cuban hosts reminded us that the U.S.-imposed Platt Amendment to the Cuban constitution gave the United States the authority to intervene in Cuban politics virtually at will. Furthermore, bilateral economic accords allowed U.S. capital to dominate the production and refining of Cuba’s primary export product, sugar. In the words of Miguel Figueras, “Cuba remained a sugar colony, just of the United States instead of Spain.” Despite the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1933, the United States continued to dominate Cuban politics and economy for another quarter century. As a result, the deep poverty, inequality, corruption and repression that characterized Cuba for most of the early 20th century, and which seemed to reach their apogee in the 1950s, has come to be associated with U.S. domination of Cuba. For the delegation, it was not relevant whether or not this was a true reflection of historic fact. What was relevant is that this is how the history of our bilateral relationship is seen from the Cuban perspective and that this understanding of the past informs Cuban engagement with the United States today. Despite evident Cuban fondness for many aspects of American culture (baseball in particular stands out) and their openness to Americans who visit the island, Cubans have no desire to return to their pre-revolutionary past. And given the realities of geography and power, there seems to be a festering undercurrent of concern among Cubans that an uncontrolled opening to the United States could do just this. Indeed, several of our hosts reminded us of the historic U.S. interest, expressed by U.S. politicians from the early 19th century onward, to dominate Cuba and the parallel belief that geography made this both natural and inevitable. This understanding of the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, reinforced by the power asymmetry between our two countries, was clearly reflected in Ambassador Alzugaray’s insistence that Cuba has to be very careful in its dealings with the United States. He argued that this was because “a mistake could prove fatal for Cuba.” He further observed that the United States and Cuba have “never had normal relations” as sovereign equals, so how could we go about constructing them now? The consequence of these apprehensions appears to be an unstated policy of keeping the United States at arm’s length for now. When asked directly what the United States could do to convince Cuba of the sincerity of its desire to improve bilateral relations, the recently retired chief economist for the Ministry of Economy and Planning suggested a series of small confidence-building measures. Ambassador Alzugaray, however, insisted that small steps were not enough. Since the United States is the bigger country, it “needs to make a bigger effort.” The Cuban motivation to prevent a rapid warming in U.S.-Cuban relations also seems to reflect the regime’s historic use of U.S. hostility to unite the country against threats to the Revolution. All of the Cuban academics and former government officials with whom we spoke agreed that the economic and political “updating” of the Cuban system was as essential to the survival of Cuban socialism and its governing structure as it would be difficult to implement. They were convinced that to be successful, the early, critical phase of the reform process had to be undertaken with a Castro in power. This was because, as noted above, only a Castro has the legitimacy to convince Cubans to accept the third massive reorganization of the economy since 1959. Implicit in this opinion is the recognition that such profound economic change will produce opposition which, if not kept in check, could threaten the success of the reforms and thus the survival of the revolutionary project. In this context, U.S. hostility is apt to remain a useful if not essential tool for mitigating opposition to reform during the first and most difficult years of the process. This reading of the Cuban attitude toward the United States was reinforced by a recitation of the history of Cuban responses to U.S. attempts to reduce bilateral hostility provided by the Chief of the U.S. Mission in Cuba, John Caulfield. We were reminded that President Ford’s efforts to reduce tensions were greeted by Cuba’s decision to send troops to Angola. Carter’s efforts to normalize relations were greeted by the Mariel boatlift. Clinton’s were met by the shooting down of a Brothers to the Rescue plane. Finally, most recently, Obama efforts were greeted by the arrest and imprisonment of a USAID contractor on charges of espionage. Although Caulfield did not explicitly connect the dots, his meaning was clear: Alan Gross was likely arrested either to prevent any reduction in tensions between the two countries or because improving ties with the United States is simply not that important to Cuba. Whatever the reason for Alan Gross’ arrest, it is clear that Cuba is not preoccupied with encouraging the United States to end the embargo. Time and again we were told that economic reform is Cuba’s number one priority—the United States is not. The two countries do cooperate—on hurricane tracking, drug trafficking, migration, and preparing for potential gulf oil spills—but extending and improving bilateral cooperation is not high on the Cuban foreign policy agenda. Instead, Cuban foreign policy continues to emphasize efforts to maintain Cuban sovereignty and identity, which Ambassador Alzugaray noted have historically been most directly threatened by the United States. It is now charged with supporting the economic reform process by promoting foreign direct investment and the diversification of Cuban economic ties. In this context, the only potential role for the United States in the coming years that was mentioned by our Cuban hosts is the growing role of Cuban-American investment in Cuba.

### Agriculture

#### No solvency— multiple barriers prevent Cuban ag expansion

Kost 04

William Kost is an Agricultural Economist with ERS, u.s.. Department of Agriculture

UBAN AGRICULTURE: TO BE OR NOT TO BE ORGANIC?

<http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume14/pdfs/kost.pdf>

In spite of successes, Cuba’s urban agriculture program faces several problems that limit further expansion. Seed shortages continue. Land remains in short¶ supply. Soil quality of available land is low. Many¶ years of spilled pollutants¶ have contaminated much¶ of the available urban land. Significant portions of¶ land are covered with litter. The major problem, and¶ the hardest to address, continues to be a fresh water¶ shortage. This shortage is further compounded by¶ Cuba’s dilapidated infrastructure, which constrains¶ movement of available water, and the lack of energy¶ needed to power pumps.

#### The impact is exaggerated – Cuban ag isn’t sustainable

Thompson and Stephens, 12 – \* Ph.D. Curriculum and Education Director @ Duke University AND \*\* Marian Cheek Jackson Center (Charles D. and Alexander, “Visions for Sustainable Agriculture in Cuba and the United States: Changing Minds and Models through Exchange”, Southern States, March 22 2013, <http://www.southernspaces.org/2012/visions-sustainable-agriculture-cuba-and-united-states-changing-minds-and-models-through-exchan>) //SP

Following the Cuban Revolution (1953–59), the Soviet Union’s (USSR) agricultural imperatives drove the island toward state-run farms, marginalizing many family run operations. The breakup of the USSR in 1990 spelled the end of Soviet agricultural influence but intensified Cuban food shortages. Cuba began to look within for solutions, finding indigenous knowledge and encouraging local innovation. Exaggerated praise for developments in the country’s sustainable agriculture belies the reality that Cuba is no utopia. Popular descriptions often oversimplify the narrative of Cuba’s sustainable agriculture. For example, the website of the Durham, North Carolina, non-profit NEEM (Natural Environment Ecological Management) features a narrative sketch that labels the rise of organic garden collectives in Cuban cities "the urban agriculture miracle."5 Others have suggested that we can expect "an ecological agriculture" in Cuba’s future.6 In much sustainable agriculture praise of Cuba, we do not hear that the country (like the U.S.) has confinement hog and chicken houses, that major U.S. food conglomerates are already selling vast quantities of grain and other products there, or that the embargo on trade with Cuba does not apply to U.S. agribusiness. We are not told that thousands work in small farming because they have no other option. Agricultural work is popular in Cuba, in part, because state-supported income is drying up for hundreds of thousands of wage earners and there is often nowhere else to turn but to small-scale farms and gardens. Yet much of Cuba’s former sugarcane land, once a volatile but powerful economic life-force, is idle and in poor condition. Even with its admirable innovations in sustainable and organic farming, Cuba’s domestic agricultural producers cannot meet the food needs of the island’s population; there is a real sense of food insecurity. Looking for food (in dollar stores, on the black market, legally), is a major pre-occupation for much of the population. Cuba imports at least 80 percent of its food, with much of it coming from its largest trading partners—China and Venezuela. This is hardly a sustainable scenario, and while there does not appear to be starvation in Cuba, food shortages remain a problem, even as the government’s meager food rationing is fading.7 However, household food insecurity is also on the rise in the U.S. today. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture at least 14.5% of U.S. households were food insecure at some time during the year in 2010, up from 11% in 2005.

#### Status quo solves: other countries are beginning to adopt the Cuban model now

Friedman**,** New York Times,2012

(Noah, “Urban Agriculture in Cuba (Photo Essay)”, 10-18, https://nacla.org/news/2012/10/18/urban-agriculture-cuba-photo-essay)

Cubans see their urban agriculture movement as a possible solution as the world begins to grapple with increasing prices and demand for food and fuel. Many other countries have begun to use the Cuban experience as a model as locally grown, organic produce becomes more popular worldwide. In 2007, Fidel Castro warned in the first published essay after his illness: "More than three billion people in the world are being condemned to a premature death from hunger and thirst" by diverting food crops to biofuels. In the past four years, food prices have indeed skyrocketed and a 2011 report by Oxfam identifies biofuel production as a principal cause of food insecurity. Some Cubans see their urban agriculture movement as a possible solution as the world begins to grapple with increasing prices and demand for food and fuel: "There is an ecological trend, a green philosophy. This is an urgent call, an immediate future; the large urban centers, with the problems of oil production and the transport of goods, this could be a worldwide solution as it has been in Cuba. We have the advantage of having gone through what other countries may experience in 50 years,” says Miguel Salcines Lopez, President of Havana’s largest urban agriculture cooperative, Vivero Alamar. Beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Cuba entered a period of extreme shortages that came to be known as "The Special Period." With imports such as food, fuel, pesticides, and fertilizers disappearing almost overnight, Cubans began to grow their own produce wherever they could—balconies, empty lots, and roof-tops. Initially these were grassroots initiatives born of necessity, but over the next decade they would become a central tenet of state planning and a pillar for the island's economy. A homage to the history of Cuban urban agriculture in the home of Oscar Aleman Perez in Havana. In the 1970s and '80s, Raul Castro, as Defense Minister, encouraged the development of urban agriculture and oversaw experimental organic farming in military facilities. In those days, the organoponicos, as they came to be known, were introduced in preparation for a possible worldwide embargo of Cuba; today they are a training ground and growth area for Raul Castro's economic reforms that allow for more small business. In 1994, the Ministry of Agriculture institutionalized urban agriculture initiatives under one umbrella. Projects from informal family gardens (huertos), to large cooperatives (organoponicos), to state-owned gardens would all receive assistance from the ministry, which sought to provide free land to residents for gardens, through support in the start-up phase, providing seed banks, and overseeing hundreds of horticultural clubs for information exchange. Many Cubans assumed that as the shortages of the 1990s faded, so too would urban agriculture, but instead it has expanded in the last decade. Indeed, many other countries have begun to use the Cuban experience as a model as locally grown, organic produce becomes more popular worldwide. Of the recently released linamientos, or guidelines, for economic and social reforms in Cuba, 12 refer to urban agriculture. Number 174 states the necessity of increasing agricultural initiatives that can substitute for food imports, “with emphasis in the execution of the urban agriculture program, which should be extended to the entire country.”

#### Embargo triggered Cuba’s shift to sustainable development, lifting the embargo will crush it

**Gonzalez, Seattle University law professor, 2003**

(Carmen, Seasons Of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture And Food Security In Cuba, Summer, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=987944>)

Notwithstanding these problems, the greatest challenge to the agricultural development strategy adopted by the Cuban government in the aftermath of the Special Period is likely to be external – the renewal of trade relations with the United States. From the colonial era through the beginning of the Special Period, economic development in Cuba has been constrained by Cuba’s relationship with a series of primary trading partners. Cuba’s export-oriented sugar monoculture and its reliance on imports to satisfy domestic food needs was imposed by the Spanish colonizers, reinforced by the United States, and maintained during the Soviet era. It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the strengthening of the U.S. embargo that Cuba was able to embark upon a radically different development path. Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions. Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union. Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.n413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time. It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cuban sovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.n416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries. Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers – as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century. Cuba is once again at a crossroads – as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans. The distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation. The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba’s alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

#### Greater US imports will out-compete Cuban organics and collapse the system – NAFTA empirics prove

**McKibben, co-founder of 350.org international climate campaign, 2005**

(Bill, “The Cuba Diet”, Harper’s Magazine, April, <http://billtotten.blogspot.com/2005/04/cuba-diet.html>)

One question is: How resilient is the new Cuban agriculture? Despite ever tougher restrictions on US travel and remittances from relatives, the country has managed to patch together a pretty robust tourist industry in recent years: Havana's private restaurants fill nightly with Canadians and Germans. The government's investment in the pharmaceutical industry appears to be paying off, too, and now people who are fed by ox teams are producing genetically engineered medicines at some of the world's more advanced labs. Foreign exchange is beginning to flow once more; already many of the bicycles in the streets have been replaced by buses and motorbikes and Renaults. Cuba is still the most unconsumer place I've ever been - there's even less to buy than in the old Soviet Union - but sooner or later Castro will die. What then? Most of the farmers and agronomists I interviewed professed conviction that the agricultural changes ran so deep they would never be eroded. Perez, however, did allow that there were a lot of younger oxen drivers who yearned to return to the cockpits of big tractors, and according to news reports some of the country's genetic engineers are trying to clone White Udder herself from leftover tissue. If Cuba simply opens to the world economy - if Castro gets his professed wish and the US embargo simply disappears, replaced by a free-trade regime - it's very hard to see how the sustainable farming would survive for long. We use pesticides and fertilizers because they make for incredibly cheap food. None of that dipping the seedling roots in some bacillus solution, or creeping along the tomato rows looking for aphids, or taking the oxen off to be shoed. Our industrial agriculture - at least as heavily subsidized by Washington as Cuba's farming once was subsidized by Moscow - simply overwhelms its neighbors. For instance, consider Mexico and corn. Not long ago the journalist Michael Pollan told the story of what happened when NAFTA opened that country's markets to a flood of cheap, heavily subsidized US maize: the price fell by half, and 1.3 million small farmers were put out of business, forced to sell their land to larger, more corporate farms that could hope to compete by mechanizing (and lobbying for subsidies of their own). A study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace enumerated the environmental costs: fertilizer runoff suffocating the Sea of Cortez, water shortages getting worse as large-scale irrigation booms. Genetically modified corn varieties from the United States are contaminating the original strains of the crop, which began in southern Mexico.

#### No resource wars- empirically conflicts don’t escalate

**Salehyan, University of North Texas assistant political science professor, 2008**

(Idean, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet”, Journal of Peace Research, 45.3, SAGE, ldg)

A few caveats are in order here. It is important to note, again, that the most severe effects of climate change are likely to be felt in the future, and the future is inherently uncertain.4 While fundamental shifts in the environment are not inconceivable, our best bet for predicting what is to come is to look at what has transpired in the past. Since it is frequently argued that climate change will lead to resource scarcities and exacerbate inequality, it is possible to draw upon past evidence regarding these factors to develop a sense of how conflicts might unfold given changes in the Earth’s atmosphere. Additionally, I do not take issue with the claim that climate change will present considerable challenges for human societies and ecosystems more generally. Humanitarian crises stemming, in part, from climate change have the potential to be severe, and steps must be taken quickly to attenuate such contingencies. Rather, my purpose here is to underscore the point that environmental processes, by themselves, cannot explain why, where, and when fighting will occur; rather, the interaction between environmental and political systems is critical for understanding organized armed violence. First, the deterministic view has poor predictive power as to where and when conflicts will break out. **For every potential example of an environmental catastrophe or resource shortfall that leads to violence, there are many more counter-examples in which conflict never occurs.** But **popular accounts** typically **do not look at the dogs that do not bark**. Darfur is frequently cited as a case where desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing.5 Yet, food scarcity and hunger are problems endemic to many countries – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – but similar problems elsewhere have not led to large-scale violence. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, food shortages and malnutrition affect more than a third of the population in Malawi, Zambia, the Comoros, North Korea, and Tanzania,6 although none of these countries have experienced fullblown civil war and state failure. Hurricanes, coastal flooding, and droughts – which are all likely to intensify as the climate warms – are frequent occurrences which rarely lead to violence. The Asian Tsunami of 2004, although caused by an oceanic earthquake, led to severe loss of life and property, flooding, population displacement, and resource scarcity, but it did not trigger new wars in Southeast Asia. Large-scale migration has the potential to provoke conflict in receiving areas (see Reuveny, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), yet most migration flows do not lead to conflict, and, in this regard, social integration and citizenship policies are particularly important (Gleditsch, Nordås & Salehyan, 2007). **In short, resource scarcity**, natural disasters, and long-term climatic shifts **are ubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare**; therefore, environmental conditions, by themselves, cannot predict violent outbreaks. Second, **even if local skirmishes over access to resources arise, these do not always escalate to open warfare** and state collapse. While interpersonal violence is more or less common and may intensify under resource pressures, sustained armed conflict on a massive scale is difficult to conduct. Meier, Bond & Bond (2007) show that, under certain circumstances, environmental conditions have led to cattle raiding among pastoralists in East Africa, but these conflicts rarely escalate to sustained violence. Martin (2005) presents evidence from Ethiopia that, while a large refugee influx and population pressures led to localized conflict over natural resources, effective resource management regimes were able to ameliorate these tensions. Both of these studies emphasize the role of local dispute-resolution regimes and institutions – not just the response of central governments – in preventing resource conflicts from spinning out of control. Martin’s analysis also points to the importance of international organizations, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in implementing effective policies governing refugee camps. Therefore, local hostilities need not escalate to serious armed conflict and can be managed if there is the political will to do so.

#### No water wars – even otherwise hostile geopolitical conditions promote cooperation not conflict

**Wolf, Oregon State geography professor, 2007**

(Aaron, “Shared Waters: Conﬂict and Cooperation”, <http://protosh2o.act.be/VIRTUELE_BIB/Water_in_de_Wereld/CON-Waterconflicten_en_rampen/W_CON_E23_shared_waters.pdf>, ldg)

There is room for optimism, though, notably in the global community’s record of resolving water-related disputes along international waterways. For example, the record of acute conflict over international water resources is overwhelmed by the record of cooperation. Despite the tensions inherent in the international setting, riparians have shown tremendous creativity in approaching regional development, often through preventive diplomacy, and the creation of “baskets of benefits,” which allow for positive-sum, integrative allocations of joint gains. Moreover, the most vehement enemies around the world either have negotiated water sharing agreements, or are in the process of doing so as of this writing, and once cooperative water regimes are established through treaty, they turn out to be impressively resilient over time, even between otherwise hostile riparians and even as conflict is waged over other issues. Violence over water does not seem strategically rational, hydrographically effective, or economically viable. Shared interests along a waterway seem to consistently outweigh water’s conflict-inducing characteristics.

#### No warrants from Hermann ev as to why bee decline causes extinction

#### Alt causes to honey bee decline: pesticides and disease

Peter Neuman and Norman L Carreck December 2009

Swiss Bee Research Centre, Agroscope Liebefeld-Posieux Research Station ALP, CH-3033 Bern, Switzerland. 2 Department of Zoology and Entomology, Rhodes University, Grahamstown 6140, South Africa. 3 International Bee Research Association, 16, North Road, Cardiff, CF10 3DY, UK. 4 Department of Biological and Environmental Science, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, East Sussex, BN1 9QG, UK. <http://www.ask-force.org/web/Bees/Neumann-Honey-Bee-Colony-Losses-2010.pdf>

The response of the scientific community was instructive. Initially, the UK Government sent the eminent entomologist A D Imms to the Isle of Wight, but being unfamiliar with bees, he was unable to throw much light on the problem (Bailey and Ball, 1991). Other scientists soon made suggestions. By 1912, Fantham and Porter became convinced that the cause was the microsporidium Nosema apis, but this view was overshadowed by the discovery in 1919 of the tracheal mite Acarapis woodi (Rennie et al., 1921). Conventional wisdom and beekeeping text books soon accepted that this impressive mite was the cause of the “Isle of Wight Disease”, yet close examination of the original paper shows that this could not be so. Rennie et al.’s experimental results clearly demonstrated that some bees heavily infested with the mite were able to fly normally, yet other crawling bees, exhibiting the symptoms of the disease, contained no mites. One can only conclude that carried away by the excitement of their new discovery, they had failed to test Koch’s Postulates, and had jumped to conclusions. Sober reassessment of the “Isle of Wight Disease” many years later (Bailey and Ball, 1991; Bailey, 2002) led to the conclusion that the disease had been due to a combination of factors, in particular, infection by chronic bee paralysis virus (completely unknown at the time), together with poor weather which inhibited foraging, and an excess of bee colonies being kept for the amount of forage available. The recent concern over CCD has much in common with the historical “Isle of Wight Disease” episode, and many lessons can be learned. Initial concern about colony losses in one particular area, the USA, has led to global media attention. Moreover, colony losses throughout the world are being ascribed to CCD, yet that term was 2 Neumann, Carreck = 20% colony losses specifically coined to describe a precisely defined set of symptoms (vanEngelsdorp et al., 2009) and not colony losses per se. Indeed, honey bee colonies can die in many ways, and CCD is just one of them (vanEngelsdorp et al., 2010). Finally, since both honey bee host and pathogens are genetically diverse, the symptoms and causes of colony losses may well be different in different regions. Many well intentioned suggestions as to the possible causes of colony losses, including such improbable ideas as mobile telephones, genetically modified crops and nanotechnology, have perhaps overshadowed much more likely explanations such as pests and diseases, pesticides, loss of forage and beekeeping practices. For example, the long known major pest of A. mellifera apiculture, the ectoparasitic mite Varroa destructor has recently received comparatively little attention, but is certainly involved. Indeed, the broad patterns of CCD coincide with continents with different pressures from V. destructor (Fig. 1). Since African and Africanized honey bees survive without treatment for V. destructor (Martin and Medina, 2004), and the mite has not yet been discovered in Australia, this supports a central role of V. destructor for the current colony losses. In fact, data by Dahle (2010) strongly support this view, showing that regions with established mite populations had consistently higher losses than those without. After the development and dissemination of adequate mite control methods, however, losses due to V. destructor remained at tolerable limits until recently, suggesting that the mite alone cannot explain all of the recent losses. Despite comprehensive recent research efforts on these colony losses, no single driver has yet emerged as the definitive cause of the phenomenon. Instead, interactions between multiple drivers are the most probable explanation for elevated over-wintering mortality, similar to the conclusions for the Isle of Wight disease (Bailey, 2002).

#### No impact to biodiversity – species can adapt

**Brook, Adelaide professor, 2013**

(Barry, “Worrying about global tipping points distracts from real planetary threats”, 3-4, <http://bravenewclimate.com/2013/03/04/ecological-tipping-points/>, ldg)

We argue that at the global-scale, ecological “tipping points” and threshold-like “planetary boundaries” are improbable. Instead, shifts in the Earth’s biosphere follow a gradual, smooth pattern. This means that it might be impossible to define scientifically specific, critical levels of biodiversity loss or land-use change. This has important consequences for both science and policy. Humans are causing changes in ecosystems across Earth to such a degree that there is now broad agreement that we live in an epoch of our own making: the Anthropocene. But the question of just how these changes will play out — and especially whether we might be approaching a planetary tipping point with abrupt, global-scale consequences — has remained unsettled. A tipping point occurs when an ecosystem attribute, such as species abundance or carbon sequestration, responds abruptly and possibly irreversibly to a human pressure, such as land-use or climate change. Many local- and regional-level ecosystems, such as lakes,forests and grasslands, behave this way. Recently however, there have been several efforts to define ecological tipping points at the global scale. At a local scale, there are definitely warning signs that an ecosystem is about to “tip”. For the terrestrial biosphere, tipping points might be expected if ecosystems across Earth respond in similar ways to human pressures and these pressures are uniform, or if there are strong connections between continents that allow for rapid diffusion of impacts across the planet. These criteria are, however, unlikely to be met in the real world. First, ecosystems on different continents are not strongly connected. Organisms are limited in their movement by oceans and mountain ranges, as well as by climatic factors, and while ecosystem change in one region can affect the global circulation of, for example, greenhouse gases, this signal is likely to be weak in comparison with inputs from fossil fuel combustion and deforestation. Second, the responses of ecosystems to human pressures like climate change or land-use change depend on local circumstances and will therefore differ between locations. From a planetary perspective, this diversity in ecosystem responses creates an essentially gradual pattern of change, without any identifiable tipping points. This puts into question attempts to define critical levels of land-use change or biodiversity loss scientifically. Why does this matter? Well, one concern we have is that an undue focus on planetary tipping points may distract from the vast ecological transformations that have already occurred. After all, as much as four-fifths of the biosphere is today characterised by ecosystems that locally, over the span of centuries and millennia, have undergone human-driven regime shifts of one or more kinds. Recognising this reality and seeking appropriate conservation efforts at local and regional levels might be a more fruitful way forward for ecology and global change science. Corey Bradshaw (see also notes published here on ConservationBytes.com) Let’s not get too distracted by the title of the this article – Does the terrestrial biosphere have planetary tipping points? – or the potential for a false controversy. It’s important to be clear that the planet is indeed ill, and it’s largely due to us. Species are going extinct faster than they would have otherwise. The planet’s climate system is being severely disrupted; so is the carbon cycle. Ecosystem services are on the decline. But – and it’s a big “but” – we have to be wary of claiming the end of the world as we know it, or people will shut down and continue blindly with their growth and consumption obsession. We as scientists also have to be extremely careful not to pull concepts and numbers out of thin air without empirical support. Specifically, I’m referring to the latest “craze” in environmental science writing – the idea of “planetary tipping points” and the related “planetary boundaries”. It’s really the stuff of Hollywood disaster blockbusters – the world suddenly shifts into a new “state” where some major aspect of how the world functions does an immediate about-face. Don’t get me wrong: there are plenty of localised examples of such tipping points, often characterised by something we call “hysteresis”. Brook defines hysterisis as: a situation where the current state of an ecosystem is dependent not only on its environment but also on its history, with the return path to the original state being very different from the original development that led to the altered state. Also, at some range of the driver, there can exist two or more alternative states and “tipping point” as: the critical point at which strong nonlinearities appear in the relationship between ecosystem attributes and drivers; once a tipping point threshold is crossed, the change to a new state is typically rapid and might be irreversible or exhibit hysteresis. Some of these examples include state shifts that have happened (or mostly likely will) to the cryosphere, ocean thermohaline circulation, atmospheric circulation, and marine ecosystems, and there are many other fine-scale examples of ecological systems shifting to new (apparently) stable states. However, claiming that we are approaching a major planetary boundary for our ecosystems (including human society), where we witness such transitions simultaneously across the globe, is simply not upheld by evidence. Regional tipping points are unlikely to translate into planet-wide state shifts. The main reason is that our ecosystems aren’t that connected at global scales.

#### No scenario for superbugs- virulence trades off with transmissibility

**Orent, anthropologist specializing in evolutionary epidemiology, 2005**

(Wendy, “Bird bug has flown the coop”, 10-23, lexis, ldg)

Transmissibility is the ability of the virus to get out of one host and into another. In order to do so, the virus has to do something to the host to get itself shed. People act like transmissibility is just some little quirk of the genome, but what it really is, is the ability of the virus to colonize tissues, say, in the upper airways so that you sneeze or cough, and the virus is shed in large quantities. . . . You might go to work one day not feeling terribly well. You try not to sneeze all over everywhere. But flu is extraordinarily transmissible. It's these tiny, tiny particles that just fly off in a big cloud [when an infected person sneezes] and spread very easily. . . . So flu depends on keeping you out there --- going to work, you know, going to school, sitting on a bus --- if it's going to spread. It has to keep the host relatively healthy. A host can't keel over and die. Think about how ebola doesn't spread because it's so lethal that it just kills you right off. And certain forms of plague can do that, too. **They kill you very quickly so there's no chance for the bug to spread**. . . . So if transmissibility increases, the virulence should decrease, because the virus needs to keep you mobile to get you to transmit it. If you think about it, it's just Darwinian logic. **If you're too sick to transmit the disease, it dies with you**.

#### Ending the trade embargo undermines Cuba’s worm tech exports. Their expertise exist because of financial constraints – not choice

**Ewing, the Guardian, 2008**

(Ed, “Cuba's organic revolution,” 4-3, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/apr/04/organics.food)

But when the USSR collapsed in 1990/91, Cuba's ability to feed itself collapsed with it. "Within a year the country had lost 80% of its trade," explains the Cuba Organic Support Group (COSG). Over 1.3m tonnes of chemical fertilisers a year were lost. Fuel for transporting produce from the fields to the towns dried up. People started to go hungry. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (UNFAO) estimated that calorie intake plunged from 2,600 a head in the late 1980s to between 1,000 and 1,500 by 1993. Radical action was needed, and quickly. "Cuba had to produce twice as much food, with less than half the chemical inputs," according to the COSG. Land was switched from export crops to food production, and tractors were switched for oxen. People were encouraged to move from the city to the land and organic farming methods were introduced. "Integrated pest management, crop rotation, composting and soil conservation were implemented," says the COSG. The country had to become expert in techniques like worm composting and biopesticides. "Worms and worm farm technology is now a Cuban export," says Dr Stephen Wilkinson, assistant director of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba. Thus, the unique system of organoponicos, or urban organic farming, was started. "Organoponicos are really gardens," explains Wilkinson, "they use organic methods and meet local needs." "Almost overnight," says the COSG, the ministry of agriculture established an urban gardening culture. By 1995 Havana had 25,000 huertos – allotments, farmed by families or small groups – and dozens of larger-scale organoponicos, or market gardens. The immediate crisis of hunger was over. Now, gardens for food take up 3.4% of urban land countrywide, and 8% of land in Havana. Cuba produced 3.2m tonnes of organic food in urban farms in 2002 and, UNFAO says, food intake is back at 2,600 calories a day. Organoponico plaza A visit to Havana's largest organoponico, the three-hectare Organoponico Plaza, which lies a stone's throw from the city's Plaza de la Revolución and the desk of Raul Castro, confirms that the scheme is doing well. Rows of strikingly neat irrigated raised beds are home to seasonal crops of lettuces, spring onions, chives, garlic and parsley. Guava and noni fruit trees provide shade around the perimeter, while on the far side compost piles sit next to plastic tunnels used to raise seedlings. Outside in the shop, signs extol the virtues of eating your greens. The shop is open only on Mondays. Produce is sold by the people who work the garden (they keep 50% of sales, so are motivated to produce a lot) to the people who live nearby. In this case, the organoponico serves an estate that wouldn't look out of place in Tower Hamlets or Easterhouse. Yet inside, butterflies flit and the head gardener, Toni, turns sod like he is digging at Prince Charles's Highgrove estate. A success then? "In terms of improving the diet of the population it has had a beneficial effect," says Wilkinson. "And it has been a success in terms of meeting some of the food security needs," he says, "but it has not resolved the problem since the island still imports a great deal of food." And change is on the horizon, which might be good for living standards, but not be so good for Cuba's commitment to pesticide-free food. The US trade embargo is losing its "symbolic meaning", says Julie M Bunck, assistant professor of political science at the University of Louisville and author of Fidel Castro and the Quest for a Revolutionary Culture in Cuba, and as that happens, "Cuba will evolve, embrace the market in some way, begin to produce and buy and sell normally." General farming will "most likely" move away from organic methods says Wilkinson. Farming on a large scale after all, he says, has seen a reduction in pesticide and fertiliser use mainly due to "financial constraints, not choice".

#### Alt causes to bio-d loss – Every species isn’t key

**Sarkar, UT integrative biology professor, 2005**

(Sahotra, Biodiversity and Environmental Philosophy: An Introduction, pg 13-15, ldg)

The first of the three flawed arguments is the “rivet argument,” often invoked to justify measures designed to protect every species from extinction. Planet Earth is supposed to be similar to an airplane. Given an airplane in reasonably good condition, we can conclude that the loss of a single rivet will not make the plane unsafe. But if we allow that rivet to be lost, the argument goes, we will slither down a slippery slope. Sooner or later, the next rivet will be like the proverbial last straw that breaks the camel’s back. The plane will be doomed when we lose that rivet. Each species on Earth is supposed to be like one of these rivets. We may allow one to go to extinction and continue to live with no real fear of the entire biosphere collapsing. But ultimately, as more species disappear, it will collapse. Just as we do not really know which rivet is the last, we do not know which species will mark the end of our biological world.  Most biodiversity conservationists will probably admit that this argument has strong rhetorical value, especially because it attempts to justify the conservation of every species, not just those for which we can specify a definite positive value at present. Nevertheless, it is a flawed argument. For one thing, it is an argument only by analogy, no stronger than the strength of the analogy. Is the biosphere really that much of an airplane? Or, to borrow an analogy from Hume, is it perhaps more like a vegetable? For most vegetables, the loss of a leaf (or of many other parts) will lead only to the growth of another one. Thus, under the vegetable metaphor, there is no reason to suppose that the biosphere will collapse after another extinction. Moreover, there are some, though not very good, reasons to suppose that the vegetable metaphor captures something interesting about evolutionary processes: an extinction may well free up space for new speciation. After all, almost every mass extinction in the past has probably been followed by a burst of speciation renewing the diversity of life on Earth. However, the anthropogenic extinctions of today are probably unlike all past mass extinctions: they may well be altering the surface of the Earth in a way that makes it impossible for any living organism to survive. Thus the last point should not be taken to suggest, even if we largely accept the vegetable analogy, that we should have no concern for the ongoing extinctions.  Even without appealing to the general failure of arguments by analogy, there is reason to deny the force of the rivet argument. Loss of all of the rivets in a seat inside the airplane will lead to no major disaster. We can let a lot of these disappear, saving our concern for those rivets that are known to make a functional difference to the safety of the plane. Loss of a species of bacteria or even a large predator, will not lead to the collapse of an ecological community (a group of interacting species sharing the same habitat – see Chapter 5, § 5.1). Tigers (Panthera Tigris) have disappeared from most of their original range during the last century. To the extent that we can tell after so short a period of time, though there are good reasons to mourn these disappearances, the biological communities in these habitats have not themselves disappeared, Although made poorer and less interesting by the loss of tigers, these communities have nevertheless persisted. At most, what can be said is that, if there are so-called keystone species that, by definition, are critical to the continued persistence of a community, then these species deserve special attention. But even this does not provide an argument for the preservation of every species. It only provides an argument for the preservation of keystone species. That is often the case, but even then, as our knowledge grows, we will systematically lose any rationale for preserving more and more species because they will be known not to be keystone species. This is no argument for general biodiversity conservation. It should also not be forgotten that, as the years have gone by, it has become empirically less and less clear that most ecological communities have keystone species.

#### 3,000 gallons leak daily on Santa Barbara’s coast – if we prove it’s a bio-d hotspot it means no impact

GPA No Date, Global Marine Oil Pollution Information Gateway, (“Natural sources of marine oil pollution”, http://oils.gpa.unep.org/facts/natural-sources.htm, no date – read in 2013) Kerwin

Crude oil and natural gas seeps naturally out of fissures in the ocean seabed and eroding sedimentary rock. These seeps are natural springs where liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons leak out of the ground (like springs that ooze oil and gas instead of water). Whereas freshwater springs are fed by underground pools of water, oil and gas seeps are fed by natural underground accumulations of oil and natural gas (see [USGS](http://oils.gpa.unep.org/facts/natural-sources.htm#USGS) illustration). Natural oil seeps are used in identifying potential petroleum reserves. As pointed out by the National Research Council ([NRC)](http://oils.gpa.unep.org/facts/natural-sources.htm#NRC) of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, "natural oil seeps contribute the highest amount of oil to the marine environment, accounting for 46 per cent of the annual load to the world's oceans. -- Although they are entirely natural, these seeps significantly alter the nature of nearby marine environments. For this reason, they serve as natural laboratories where researchers can learn how marine organisms adapt over generations of chemical exposure. Seeps illustrate how dramatically animal and plant population levels can change with exposure to ocean petroleum". [NOAA](http://oils.gpa.unep.org/facts/natural-sources.htm#NOAA) describe a natural seepage area in California: "One of the best-known areas where this happens is Coal Oil Point along the California Coast near Santa Barbara. An estimated 2,000 to 3,000 gallons of crude oil is released naturally from the ocean bottom every day just a few miles offshore from this beach".

#### No Impact – More oil is leaked than spilled annually

Kvenvolden 03, K. A. Kvenvolden is a 40 year veteran of authoring peer-reviewed scientific studies. He was part of the US Geological Survey. Over 10 other studies are cited in this article. Just look up this guy on google and you’ll see how legit he is. (“Natural seepage of crude oil into the marine environment ”, http://137.227.239.65/reports/reprints/Kvenvolden\_GML\_23.pdf, 10/3/2013) Kerwin

Abstract Recent global estimates of crude-oil seepage rates suggest that about 47% of crude oil currently entering the marine environment is from natural seeps, whereas 53% results from leaks and spills during the extraction, transportation, reﬁning, storage, and utilization of petroleum. The amount of natural crude-oil seepage is currently estimated to be 600,000 metric tons per year, with a range of uncertainty of 200,000 to 2,000,000 metric tons per year. Thus, natural oil seeps may be the single most important source of oil that enters the ocean, exceeding each of the various sources of crude oil that enters the ocean through its exploitation by humankind. Crude oil enters the marine environment by two principal processes. One process involves human activities related to the extraction, transportation, reﬁning, storage, and utilization of petroleum (crude oil and natural gas). An example is marine oil spills, caused by failures in human-designed transportation systems such as tankers and pipelines, which are built to move crude oil from one place to another. The second process involves natural oil seepage. The term oil seepis used here to mean naturally occurring seepage of crude oil and tar. Crude-oil seeps are geographically common and have likely been active through much of geologic time (Hunt 1996). The importance of crude oil entering the marine environment was recognized by the US National Academy of Sciences in a series of three reports (NAS 1975, 1985, 2003). The NAS (1975) report ‘‘Petroleum in the Marine Environment’’ was NASs ﬁrst comprehensive attempt to estimate the amount of crude oil that enters the oceans from all known sources. A signiﬁcant conclusion was that about 10% of crude oil entering the oceans during the early 1980s came from natural oil seeps, whereas about 27% came from oil production, transportation, and reﬁning. The remaining 63% came from atmospheric emissions, municipal and industrial sources, and urban and river runoﬀ. Crude-oil seeps are natural phenomena over which humankind has little direct control, although oil production probably has reduced oil-seepage rates (Quigley et al. 1999). However, secondary recovery methods using increased formation pressures could possibly cause increased rates of oil seepage. Nevertheless, crude oil that enters naturally into the marine environment does establish a contaminant backgroundagainst which pollution resulting from human activities (i.e., oil spills) can be measured.

### Extra Impact Defense Cards

#### No impact to bio-diversity loss - their ev is bad science

**Hance, Mongabay senior writer, 2013**

(Jeremy, “Warnings of global ecological tipping points may be overstated”, 3-5, <http://news.mongabay.com/2013/0305-hance-tipping-points.html#r2IbUBDMyux2eU7i.99>, ldg)

There's little evidence that the Earth is nearing a global ecological tipping point, according to a new Trends in Ecology and Evolution paper that is bound to be controversial. The authors argue that despite numerous warnings that the Earth is headed toward an ecological tipping point due to environmental stressors, such as habitat loss or climate change, it's unlikely this will occur anytime soon—at least not on land. The paper comes with a number of caveats, including that a global tipping point could occur in marine ecosystems due to ocean acidification from burning fossil fuels. In addition, regional tipping points, such as the Arctic ice melt or the Amazon rainforest drying out, are still of great concern. "When others have said that a planetary critical transition is possible/likely, they've done so without any underlying model (or past/present examples, apart from catastrophic drivers like asteroid strikes)," lead author Barry Brook and Director of Climate Science at the University of Adelaide told mongabay.com. "It’s just speculation and we’ve argued [...] that this conjecture is not logically grounded. No one has found the opposite of what we suggested—they’ve just proposed it." According to Brook and his team, a truly global tipping point must include an impact large enough to spread across the entire world, hitting various continents, in addition to causing some uniform response. "These criteria, however, are very unlikely to be met in the real world," says Brook. The idea of such a tipping point comes from ecological research, which has shown that some ecosystems will flip to a new state after becoming heavily degraded. But Brook and his team say that tipping points in individual ecosystems should not be conflated with impacts across the Earth as a whole. Even climate change, which some scientists might consider the ultimate tipping point, does not fit the bill, according to the paper. Impacts from climate change, while global, will not be uniform and hence not a "tipping point" as such. "Local and regional ecosystems vary considerably in their responses to climate change, and their regime shifts are therefore likely to vary considerably across the terrestrial biosphere," the authors write. Barry adds that, "from a planetary perspective, this diversity in ecosystem responses creates an essentially gradual pattern of change, without any identifiable tipping points." The paper further argues that biodiversity loss on land may not have the large-scale impacts that some ecologists argue, since invasive species could potentially take the role of vanishing ones. "So we can lose the unique evolutionary history (bad, from an intrinsic viewpoint) but not necessarily the role they impart in terms of ecosystem stability or provision of services," explains Brook. The controversial argument goes against many scientists' view that decreased biodiversity will ultimately lessen ecological services, such as pollination, water purification, and carbon sequestration.

#### No resource wars- best and most recent studies prove scarcity empirically causes cooperation- their data is flawed

**Buckland, International Peace Bureau, 2007**

(Ben, “A Climate of War? Stopping the Securitisation of Global Climate Change”, http://ipb.org/i/pdf-files/A\_Climate\_of\_War\_Stopping\_the\_Securitisation\_of\_Climate\_Change.pdf, ldg)

Garnering less publicity were early defectors from the climate change and conflict school described above. Most notable is perhaps the State Failure Taskforce, set up in 1994 by the then United States (US) Vice-President Al Gore to look for environmental and political causes of state failure. Against expectations, the Taskforce found **no evidence** for a link between environmental degradation and violent conflict, conclusions which are cogent with a number of contemporary and **more recent** studies. A further blow to the environment and conflict link suggested by the Neo-Malthusian thinkers cited above has come in the form of criticism which directly attacks their research design. Perhaps most persuasive among these attacks is the contention that many of the case studies used to support the Neo-Malthusian argument are selected on the dependent variable, that is to say, they treat only cases in which environmental degradation and conflict are both present. Without more comprehensive data, it is argued, their usefulness is reduced to that of well-researched anecdotes – interesting but hardly predictive of conflict elsewhere.10 The second major criticism is that Neo-Malthusian models of conflict are underspecified. In other words, they offer little indication as to which variables may or may not be important in triggering or prolonging conflict – they are simply too elaborate to do so.11 Alternative models and schools of thought (such as that elaborated by the State Failure Taskforce above and the systematic 1998 study of Hague and Ellingsen) emphasise the fact that, while there is consensus on several factors causing conflict, there are many others for which direct causal links simply do not exist.12 With regard to the former category, factors generally agreed to influence the likelihood of intrastate conflict include: levels of economic development, history of conflict and the existence of either ethnic dominance or ethnic polarisation. In the second category, factors that are likely to increase the risk of conflict but that do not act as independent variables are: political instability, the time elapsed since independence, dependency on natural resources, large population size and rough terrain.13 Turning to interstate conflict, the factors on which there is general consensus include: geographical proximity, non-democratic regimes, relative power and a history of conflict.14 What is clear from these two sets of variables is that environmental factors are, at best, of secondary importance.15 Some scholars even go so far as to suggest that resource scarcity may have **precisely the opposite effect** from that predicted by proponents of Neo-Malthusianism. An example of this is a recent study Aaron T. Wolf which suggests that shared freshwater resources may in fact lead to greater cooperation between riparian states.16 This conclusion is supported by data from the BAR Project Database which lists 1831 waterrelated “events” (either conflict or cooperation) between riparian states. Of these, **1228** **are examples of cooperation** and many of the others are **small-scale disputes rather than full-blown armed conflic**

No escalation for food

Put three biodiversity cards

#### There are multiple alt causes to water shortages

McCarthy, 3

Michael McCarthy in March 5, 2003 (Source: Common Dreams.org [http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0305-05.htm], Title: Water Scarcity Could Affect Billions: Is This the Biggest Crisis of All?, AB)

**Population growth, pollution and climate change, all accelerating, are likely to combine to produce a drastic decline in water supply in the coming decades,** according to the World Water Development Report, published today. And of course **that supply is already problematic for up to a third of the world's population.**

#### No impact to bee shortage, beekeepers replace lost bees

Hargreaves 12 **[**Steve, B.A. in environmental studies, “Honeybee die-off shouldn’t sting”, 2/7/2012, http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/07/news/economy/honey\_bees/index.htm]

Now for the good news. Beekeepers have been able to rejuvenate their hives each year so that by summer the population is back to previous levels.¶ There's another bit of good news, too. Agricultural yields are rising, which means that while rejuvenating beehives is costly, the cost isn't making its way to the supermarket.¶ "It shouldn't be a significant item on the radar screen of consumers," said Daniel Sumner, an agricultural economist at The University of California Davis and an author of the paper "Bee-conomics." "It's not that big of a deal."¶ This isn't to minimize the severity of the bee problem here.¶ The die-off is being mainly observed in captive honeybee hives -- the kind commercial beekeepers tote around the country on flatbed trucks, stopping for a few weeks at time to pollinate various crops including almonds, cantaloupe, apples and blueberries.¶ But it's thought that wild bees -- which are much more difficult to observe -- are also dying. That's raising concerns about what's going on in our environment.¶ Honeybees dying in the winter have always been one of the challenges of beekeeping, only now it's getting worse. And part of the die-off is particularly mysterious. About 10% of the bees are simply vanishing, disappearing without leaving any bee bodies behind.¶ Job hunt 2012: It's time to get dirty¶ "They could just fly away," said Kim Kaplin, a spokeswoman for the Agricultural Research Service, a branch of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. "But that would be unusual because they aren't taking any of their honey with them."¶ And while honeybees pollinate many fruits and vegetables, other food crops like rice, wheat and corn are pollinated by the wind.¶ Plus, honeybees aren't native to North America to begin with. They were brought here by European colonists. And while the die-off might raise questions about the health of our environment, the loss of the honeybee isn't a direct threat to our ecology.

#### No impact to water wars – cooperation

Allouche 11 – Jeremy Allouche, Institute of Development Studies, UK, January 2011, "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global tradestar, open," Food Policy, Volume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3-S8, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example [Smith, 2009](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0315)), NGOs ([International Alert, 2007](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0175)) and within international organizations ([UNEP, 2007](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0340)). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ ([Lewis, 2007](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0195)). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.¶ In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in [Butts, 1997](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0060), p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.¶ The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict ([Wolf, 1998](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0360), p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate ([Otchet, 2001](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0260), p. 18).

#### Cascade scenarios aren't possible

**Zeller, Huffington Post senior writer, 2013**

(Tom, “Tipping Points: Can Humanity Break The Planet”, 3-2, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-zeller-jr/global-tipping-points_b_2793154.html>, ldg)

As for Planet Earth, a paper published Thursday in the journal Trends in Ecology and Evolution suggests that while human society does a very thorough job of modifying and, often enough, permanently and abruptly changing the dynamics of local and regional ecosystems, the collective impact of all this on a planetary scale is too often overstated. Dire warnings that our localized impacts could trigger global-scale "tipping points," after which the spinning cogs and gears that underpin our entire terrestrial biosphere are thrown abruptly and permanently out of whack, have no scientific basis, the authors argue. Global-scale changes, such that they are, come about smoothly and slowly, they say. "This is good news because it says that we might avoid the doom-and-gloom scenario of abrupt, irreversible change," Professor Barry Brook, lead author of the paper and director of Climate Science at the University of Adelaide in Australia, said in a statement accompanying the study's release. "A focus on planetary tipping points may both distract from the vast ecological transformations that have already occurred, and lead to unjustified fatalism about the catastrophic effects of tipping points." "An emphasis on a point of no return is not particularly helpful for bringing about the conservation action we need," Brook added. "We must continue to seek to reduce our impacts on the global ecology without undue attention on trying to avoid arbitrary thresholds." This, of course, flies directly in the face of a growing body of research over the last several years -- much of it suggesting that there are very real planetary boundaries beyond which the entire terra machina starts to break down. This was the core of an extensive exploration published in the journal Nature in 2009. In an email message, James E. Hansen, who heads the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and is an adjunct professor at Columbia University's Earth Institute, said that tipping points may unfold more smoothly than people generally understand, but that they represent points of no return nonetheless. He also suggested that dismissing the notion of global tipping points out of hand was a mistake. "Tipping points are real, albeit misunderstood by some people," he said. Last June, in another paper published in Nature, a team of "biologists, ecologists, complex-systems theoreticians, geologists and paleontologists, from the United States, Canada, South America and Europe," according the University of California, Berkeley, which spearheaded the study, argued that "population growth, widespread destruction of natural ecosystems, and climate change may be driving Earth toward an irreversible change in the biosphere, a planet-wide tipping point that would have destructive consequences absent adequate preparation and mitigation." The authors of Thursday's study suggest this is nonsense. To prove their point, the team of Australian, American and British scientists looked at the impacts of four fundamental ecosystem influencers: Climate change; land-use changes (turning forest to agricultural land, for example, or native grasslands to pasture); the fragmentation of various habitats; and overall reductions in the richness and diversity of species. There is little doubt that humans have a hand in all of these, and there is also little doubt they contribute to fundamental and quite often permanent changes in the way local and regional ecosystems work. As a very simple example, think of the fast-growing and aggressive plant kudzu -- artificially introduced to the U.S. by way of Japan in the late 19th century and now, well, everywhere. Amid a fertile stand of trees and scrub and their dependent wildlife, kudzu can easily take over, strangling the local native vegetation, stripping resident critters of their accustomed food sources, and, at some juncture, causing the interdependent system that had grown up in that spot to collapse, with little practical ability to bounce back. Sure, a new system is in place, but the "regime" has been changed. The authors of Thursday's study, however, suggest that the local impacts of any stressor -- be it kudzu, or even rising temperatures due to human-driven global warming -- are vastly different in disparate parts of the globe. This heterogeneity of responses suggests that, on the whole, the planetary system would remain pretty stable -- or at the very least, global-scale changes will tend to be very gradual, rather than abrupt and catastrophic.

### Extra I/L Stuff

#### Cuban agriculture is sustainable now

Santa Maria Times 13

<http://santamariatimes.com/calendar/community/learning-from-the-most-sustainable-place-on-earth-cuban-permaculturist/event_000d5b1c-f45c-11e2-81ad-10604b9f2f3c.html>

Santa Barbara Permaculture Network hosts Roberto Perez, Cuban environmental educator featured in the award winning documentary, "The Power of Community, How Cuba Survived Peak Oil" currently in the U.S. promoting the 11th International Permaculture Convergence (IPC11) to be held in Cuba in November of 2013.

The Living Planet Report from the World Wildlife Fund in 2007 identified Cuba as the only sustainable country in the world. The study involved two key parameters for measuring sustainable development, a commitment to "improving the quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems". Cuba was the ONLY country on earth to achieve satisfactory benchmarks in both criteria for sustainable development.¶ Formerly importing most of its food, Cuba's agriculture is now 95% organic, with the city of Havana producing over 60% of its own fruits and vegetables within the city's urban spaces. At the same time, Cuba has been engaging in a massive reforestation campaign, and has invested massively in alternative energy production, with a focus on solar and biofuels. ¶ A small island nation with 11,000,000 people, struggling with poverty, devastating tropical storms, and the U.S. Embargo, how did Cuba achieve these goals and distinction? What can we learn from Cuba's struggles and successes? ¶ Born in Havana in 1970, Roberto Perez is the Environmental Education & Biodiversity Conservation Program Director of the Antonio Núñez Jiménez Foundation for Nature and Humanity, the oldest environmental organization in Cuba. A graduate of the University of Havana with a degree in Biological Sciences, he later did post graduate specialization in Community Based Natural Resources Management at the University of Nova Scotia, Canada.¶ Roberto has been part of the Cuban Permaculture movement since its introduction in the country in 1993 after the so called "Special Period", caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union when Cuba lost access to oil, fertilizers, pesticides, and virtually all trading partners that the small island nation depended on to survive, facing economic collapse overnight. Roberto has traveled extensively presenting Cuba's approach to sustainable living in the face of declining petroleum and other non-renewable resources.

#### Oil from Venezuela will not collapse Cuban sustainable ag—It will expand in the status quo—and Cuba is already a global model inspiring a global movement

Ford 13

Matt Ford Reporting For CNN Can the West cultivate ideas from Cuba's 'Special Period'?

<http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/03/29/eco.cubaagriculture/>

"The industrialized world can learn that its dependency on oil will eventually push it through similar experiences to that which Cuba had to face in the 1990's, and with similar outcomes," says Julia Wright, author of "Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in an Era of Oil Scarcity: Lessons from Cuba." ¶ "We can also learn that if we do not have the necessary capacities in place, our food production system will be caught short, as was Cuba." ¶ All over the world from New Zealand to the United Kingdom members of the Transition Town Movement, which aims to help communities prepare for the twin challenges of peak oil and climate change, hold regular screenings of the film, "The Power of Community", an upbeat documentary that explores the Cuban experience, alongside films about our oil addiction such as "The End of Suburbia" and "A Crude Awakening." ¶ "Cuba inspires groups overseas wanting to develop alternative, more sustainable farming and food systems, partly based on the myth that has built up around Cuba being organic," says Wright. ¶ "Organic farming in Cuba only operates in urban areas, not rural... [but] the Cuban organic movement and the people within it are highly dedicated to their work and will continue to influence and be influenced by the organic movement overseas." ¶ The future is less clear. New allies are once again opening Cuba up to the outside world -- and providing fresh oil supplies. ¶ "Hugo Chavez is supplying Cuba with increasing quantities of oil and agrochemicals, so Cuban agriculture -- and here I'm talking about rural farms which supply 95 percent of the nation's domestic food needs -- is becoming more industrialized, though it will not revert back to the extreme practices of the Soviet era," says Wright. ¶ "Organic urban agriculture will continue and likely continue to expand out to peri-urban areas." ¶ But whatever the years ahead bring, Wright believes the experience of the "Special Period" has left its mark on Cuban society.

#### The agroecological revolution is sweeping Latin America in the status quo

Altieri & Toledo 11

Miguel A. Altieri & Victor Manuel Toledo

The agroecological revolution in Latin America: rescuing nature, ensuring food sovereignty and empowering peasants The Journal of Peasant Studies

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This paper provides an overview of what we call ‘agroecological revolution’ in Latin America. As the expansion of agroexports and biofuels continues unfolding in Latin America and warming the planet, the concepts of food sovereignty and agroecology-based agricultural production gain increasing attention. New approaches and technologies involving the application of blended agroecological science and indigenous knowledge systems are being spearheaded by a significant number of peasants, NGOs and some government and academic institutions, and they are proving to enhance food security while conserving natural resources, and empowering local, regional and national peasant organizations and movements. An assessment of various grassroots initiatives in Latin America reveals that the application of the agroecological paradigm can bring significant environmental, economic and political benefits to small farmers and rural communities as well as urban populations in the region. The trajectory of the agroecological movements in Brazil, the Andean region, Mexico, Central America and Cuba and their potential to promote broad-based and sustainable agrarian and social change is briefly presented and examined. We argue that an emerging threefold ‘agroecological revolution’, namely, epistemological, technical and social, is creating new and unexpected changes directed at restoring local self-reliance, conserving and regenerating natural resource agrobiodiversity, producing healthy foods with low inputs, and empowering peasant organizations. These changes directly challenge neoliberal modernization policies based on agribusiness and agroexports while opening new political roads for Latin American agrarian societies.